Ring signcryption is a cryptographic primitive, that allows an user to send a message in confidential, authentic and anonymous way, i.e. the recipient of the message is convinced that the message is valid and it comes from one of the ring member, but does not know the actual sender. In this paper, we show attacks on ring signcryption schemes by Li et al. (Li et al., 2008b) and Chung et al. (Chung et al., 2006) . We demonstrate anonymity and confidentiality attack on the scheme by Li et al. (Li et al., 2008b) and confidentiality attack on the scheme by Chung et al. (Chung et al., 2006) .
INTRODUCTION
Ring signature is a cryptographic primitive that enables an user to sign a message in an anonymous way by forming a ring(group) of users. The user forms the ring without getting any acceptance or acknowledgment from the users included in the ring. The verifier of the ring signature will get convinced that the signature is generated by one of the ring members without knowing which ring member has actually generated the signature. This primitive was first introduced by Rivest et al. (Rivest et al., 2001 ). Due to its elegance and wide spread application, ring signatures have widely attracted the research community. Since its introduction in 2001, a lot of ring signature schemes were proposed (Rivest et al., 2001 ) (Abe et al., 2002) (Zhang and Kim, 2002) (Herranz and Sáez, 2004) (Bender et al., 2006) . Message security and sender authentication for communication in the open channel is an essential and important requirement. A technique for answering such a requirement was proposed by Yulien Zheng in 1997 (Zheng, 1997) . The solution given by Zheng achieves confidentiality and authentication in single logical step called signcryption. After the development of signcryption primitive, a number of efficient signcryption schemes were proposed in literature till date. In scenarios where a user want to communicate a message confidentially with sender authentication and without disclosing his identity, ring signcryption is a good solution which achieves this functionality in an efficient way. Ring signcryption is a primitive which offers the services provided by both ring signature and signcryption. A number of ring signcryption schemes (Huang et al., 2005) (Yu Fang Chung, 2008) (Wang et al., 2007) (Li et al., 2008b) (Li et al., 2008a) (Zhun and Zhang, 2008) (Zhang et al., 2009) were proposed in the recent past. In this paper, we show the security weaknesses in the identity-based ring signcryption scheme by Li et al. (Li et al., 2008b) and the PKI based ring signcryption scheme by Chun et al. (Chung et al., 2006) . First, we review Li et al. scheme (Li et al., 2008b) Bilinear Pairing : Since both the schemes are based on bilinear pairing, we review the basis of bilinear pairing. Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group generated by P, with prime order q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of same order q. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties.
• Bilinearity : For all P, Q, R ∈ G 1 ,
• Non-Degeneracy : There exist P, Q ∈ G 1 such thatê(P, Q) = I G 2 , where I G 2 is the identity element of G 2 .
• Computability : There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
IDENTITY-BASED RING SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME(IBRSS)

Generic Scheme
A generic identity-based ring signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
Let U be the set of ring members and U ! ∈ U be the actual sender.
• Setup("): Given a security parameter ", the private key generator (PKG) uses this algorithm to generate the master private key Msk and system public parameters params. Here the params are made public to the user and Msk is kept secret by the PKG.
• Extract(ID i ): Given an identity ID i by user U i to PKG, the PKG uses this algorithm to generate the corresponding private key S i . PKG sends the private key S i to ID i through a secure channel.
• Signcrypt(m, U={ID 1 , . . . , ID n }, ID ! , S ! , ID B ) : On input of a message m ∈ M , a set of ring members U, the identity of the actual sender ID ! , the private key S ! of the actual sender ID ! , the receiver identity ID B to this algorithm by the actual sender ID ! , this algorithm outputs the ring signcryption # of message m from U to U B .
• Unsigncrypt(#, U,ID B , S B ): On providing the ring signcryption #, the set of ring members U, the receiver identity ID B and the private key of the receiver S B as input to this algorithm by ID B , the Unsigncrypt algorithm recovers the plaintext m, if # is a valid signcryption of m from U to ID B and outputs m to the user with identity ID B . Else, the algorithm outputs "INVALID".
We further assume that the validity of the consistency constraint that, if
Security Model
In this section we formally define the security model for identity-based ring signcryption scheme.
Confidentiality :
An identity-based ring signcryption (IBRSS) is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-IBRSS-CCA2) if there exists no polynomially bounded adversary that has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. Setup Phase: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with the security parameter " and sends the system parameters params to the adversary A and keeps the master private key Msk secret. A chooses a target identity ID T and gives ID T to C . It is assumed that A never queries the KeyExtractOracle for the private key of ID T during the entire confidentiality game.
2. First Phase: During the FirstPhase of training A makes polynomially bounded number of requests to the oracles controlled by C . The description of the oracles and the responses provided by the oracles in the first phase are listed below:
• Key Extract Oracle: A submits an identity ID i to C and requests the private key of ID i . C returns the private key S i of ID i to A.
• Signcrypt Oracle: A submits a message m, a set of ring members U, the actual sender ID ! ∈ U, a receiver identity ID B to C . C generates #, the ring signcryption of m from U to ID B and returns # to A.
• Unsigncrypt Oracle: A produces a ring signcryption #, the set of ring members U, a receiver identity ID B to C . The challenger C retrieves the private key S B = Keygen(ID B ) and recovers m from # and checks whether # is a valid ring signcryption of m from U to ID B . If # is valid then C returns m to A. Else, C returns "INVALID" to A. A adaptively queries all the above oracles, i.e. the current oracle requests may depend on the responses obtained from the previous oracle queries.
3. Challenge: A chooses two plaintext {m 0 , m 1 } ∈ M , a set of n ring members U and the target receiver identity ID T (chosen by A during the Setup Phase on which A wants to be challenged) and give this to C . C now chooses a bit b ∈ R {0, 1} and computes the challenge ring signcryption # * of m b from U to ID T . C sends # to A. 4. Second Phase: A performs polynomially bounded number of oracle queries as in FirstPhase, with the restrictions that,
• A cannot make KeyExtract query for any user in the ring U.
• A cannot make KeyExtract query for ID T .
• A should not query for Unsigncrypt oracle with (# * , U,ID T ) as input. 5. Guess: Finally, A produces a bit b and wins the game if b = b. The success probability of A is defined as,
We require that $ to be negligible with respect to " and $ is called the advantage for the adversary in the attack.
Unforgeability :
An identity-based ring signcryption scheme (IBRSS) is said to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen messages attacks (EUF-IBRSS-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. Setup Phase: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter " and generates the system parameters params and the master private key Msk. C gives the system parameters to the adversary A and keeps Msk secret. A then chooses a set of ring members U T = {U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n * } and gives U T to C . 
LI ET AL. RING SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME (Li et al., 2008b) (LRSS)
3.1 Review of the Scheme Li et al. given an efficient identity-based ring signcryption scheme in (Li et al., 2008b) . This scheme does not use any pairing computation in ring signcryption generation and uses only two pairing for ring unsigncryption. This scheme is identity-based and it comprises of four algorithms namely: LRSS.Setup, LRSS.Extract, LRSS.Signcrypt and LRSS.Unsigncrypt, which we describe below.
• LRSS.Setup : The setup algorithm is run by the PKG. Given a security parameter " as input, this algorithm performs the following, -Chooses G 1 an additive cyclic group, G 2 a multiplicative cyclic group, both of the same prime order q,ê an admissible bilinear pairing given byê :
Defines three hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , H 2 : G 2 → {0, 1} n 1 and H 3 : {0, 1} * → Z * q . Chooses master private key s ∈ R Z * q (Msk = s) and sets master public key P pub = sP, where P is a generator of G 1 . Also, chooses a secure symmetric cipher (E, D). The system parameters params are (G 1 , G 2 , n 1 ,ê, q, P, P pub , E, D, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ).
• LRSS.Extract :The PKG on getting the identity of any user ID A as input, computes the private/public key pair Q A , S A as,
-PKG sends S A to the user through secure channel.
• LRSS.Signcrypt : User ID ! for generating a ring signcryption provides the message m, the set of ring members U={U 1 ,U 2 ,. . . ,U n }, the identity of the actual sender ID ! ∈ U, the private key S i of ID ! and the receiver identity ID B as input to the LRSS.Signcrypt algorithm. This algorithms generates a valid ring signcryption on m with ring members U as senders and ID B as receiver. This is done by performing, -Chooses r ! ∈ R Z * q and computes X = r ! Q ! .
-For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, i = !, chooses a i ∈ R Z * q , computes R i = a i P and h i =H 3 (c U R i ).
-Finally, the LRSS.Signcrypt algorithm output the ring signcryption # = {U, X, c,
• LRSS.Unsigncrypt : For unsigncrypting any ring signcryption # = {U, X, c,
the receiver ID B provides the ring signcryption #, the receiver identity ID B , private key § B of receiver ID B as input to LRSS.Unsigncrypt algorithm. Unsigncryption is carried out by doing the computations given below: (X, S B ) ).
-Recovers the message m = D k (c).
-Computes h i =H 0 (c U R i ) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..n}.
-Returns the message m if # is a valid signcryption on message m from ID ! to ID B . Else, return "INVALID".
Attacks on the identity-based Ring Signcryption Scheme LRSS
This section demonstrates two different attacks on (Li et al., 2008b) . The first attack is on the anonymity of the and is given in section 3.2.1. The second attack is on the confidentiality the scheme and the details are given in 3.2.2.
Attack on Anonymity
We show that the ring signcryption scheme LRSS does not provide anonymity. Any passive observer including the receiver, who is in possession of a ring signcryption can identify the sender in this scheme. This can be demonstrated as follows, Let m be any message and # = {U = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }, X, c,
ring signcryption on m from the ring U to ID B and ID ! ∈ U be the actual sender. On seeing the ring signcryption # anyone can do the following operations to identify the actual sender ID ! ∈ U. It is to be noted that the private key of any ID i ∈ U or ID B is not required during this computation.
Anyone can do the following to identify the actual signer in the ring. For all values of i (i = 1 to n) perform the following.
Check whetherê(V, P)
If the check holds for some value of i then ID i is the actual sender. The following Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 will prove that the test given above (equation (1)) is valid.
Proof :
Lemma 2 : Let H i = X + h i Q i where U i ∈ U is the not the actual signer. Let R =ê(V, P), then R =ê(H i , P pub ).
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 it is clear that R = H i iff i = !.
Attack on Confidentiality
The LRSS is not CCA2 secure. As per the security model of (Li et al., 2008b) , during the Challenge Phase of confidentiality game, the adversary A provides two messages m 0 and m 1 and a set of ring members U = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } including the actual sender ID ! to C (Note that A does not know the actual sender ID ! ). C selects randomly a bit b and builds the challenge ring signcryption # = {U, X, c,
from the ring U to ID T . A is given access to the secret key of all users, except the target receiver ID T and members of the ring U. Now, A can perform the following,
• Set X * = X and c * = c.
• Form a new ring U * = {U 1 ,U 2 . . . ,U t } with the property U * U and also A knows the secret key of at least one U j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,t}. Let U ! * be a user from ring U * , for which A knows the private key.
• For all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,t}, j = ! * , A chooses a j ∈ R Z * q , computes R j = a j P and h j =H 3 (c U R j ).
• Chooses a random r ! * ∈ Z * q and computes
• Sets # * = {U * , X * , c * ,
• # * is entirely different from the challenge signcryption # and hence A can request the Unsigncrypt oracle for the unsigncryption of # * as if # * is a signcryption of m b from ring U * to receiver ID T .
The challenger will correctly respond with m b .
Hence, A can exactly find whether # is a signcryption of m 0 or m 1 without solving any hard problem. Thus, breaking the confidentiality of the Li et al.'s identity-based ring signcryption scheme. Correctness of # * :
CHUNG ET AL.'S ANONYMOUS SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME(CAS)
In this section, we review the anonymous signcryption scheme given by Chung et al. (Chung et al., 2006) and demonstrate an attack on confidentiality of the scheme in (Chung et al., 2006) 
Review of the Scheme
Let q denote a large prime number, E denote an elliptic curve, P denote a base point on the elliptic curve E with order q and H denote a dispersed row function with collision resistance, where q, E, P and H are public parameters, and Z q is a finite field with q elements. Let U be the ring formed by (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n ) , the private keys 
CAS.Signcrypt :
For sending a ring signcryption on a message m, from a ring U = {U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n } with U ! ∈ U as actual sender and U v as receiver, U ! performs the following,
r ) = R = rP, and (x e , y e ) = T e = rQ v .
• When t = 1 and t − 1 = n, let t = ! + 1, ! + 2, . . . , n, 1, . . . , ! − 1, select s t ∈ R [1, q − 1] and compute c t = H(m||x t−1 ) and (x t , y t ) = T t = s t P + c t Q t .
• m = E x e (m), here x e acts as a symmetric key.
• sends the encrypted text # = (m , c 1 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , R) to the verifier U v .
CAS.Unsigncrypt :
On receiving a ring signcryption # = (m , c 1 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , R), the receiver U v to unsigncrypt # uses his secret key d v and perform the following computations,
• Let t = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, calculate (x t , y t ) = T t = s t P + c t Q t and c t+1 = H(m x t ).
• Verifier U v calculates (x n , y n ) = T n = s n P + c n Q n and c 1 = H(m x n ).
• If c 1 = c 1 then # = (m , c 1 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , R) is a valid anonymous signcryption from the group U = (U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n ); otherwise, return "INVALID".
Attack on Chung et al. Scheme(CAS)
In this section we demonstrate the attack on confidentiality of Chung et al. Scheme (Chung et al., 2006) 
Attack on Confidentiality
The anonymous signcryption scheme CAS is not CCA2 secure. The attack on confidentiality is also similar to the attack proposed in 3.2.2. During the challenge phase of the confidentiality game of the ring signcryption scheme, the adversary A provides two messages m 0 and m 1 , receiver U v and a set of ring members U = {U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n } including the actual sender U ! to C . C selects randomly a bit b and generates the challenge ring signcryption # = (m , c 1 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , R) on message m b . Here, A does not know the private key of the target user U v and the private key of the ring members U = {U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U n }. A generates a valid signcryption # * with a new set of ring member U * = {U 1 ,U 2 , . . . ,U t } from the challenge signcryption # as given below,
• Let U ! * ∈ U * be the actual sender and A knows the private key d ! * corresponding to U ! * .
• Sets R * = R and (x * e , y * e ) = T * e = T e .
• Calculates (x ! * , y ! * ) = T i = k * P, where k * ∈ R [1, q − 1].
• When j = 1 and j − 1 = n, let j = ! * + 1, ! * + 2, . . . ,t, 1, . . . , ! * − 1, select s * j ∈ R [1, q − 1] and compute c * j = H(m 0 ||x * j−1 ) and (x * j , y * j ) = T * j = s j P + c j Q j .
• Compute c ! * = H(m x ! * −1 ) and s ! * = k * − d ! * c ! * (modq).
• m * = m = E x e (m b ).
• sends # * = (m * , c * 1 , s * 1 , s * 2 , . . . , s * t , R * ) to the Unsigncrypt oracle with U v as receiver. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have showed attacks on confidentiality and anonymity of Li et al.'s identity-based ring signcryption scheme. Also, we have showed the attack on confidentiality of Chung et al.'s anonymous signcryption scheme.
